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Abstract 
This paper investigates the short-term effects on the price of the ethically screened stocks of 
the Dow Jones Islamic Market World Index (DJIMWI) quarterly revisions. Using a sample of 
8,250 stocks from May 1999 through June 2012, we find a significant price reaction of the 
ethically screened stocks following additions and deletions. The results show that additions 
(deletions) from emerging stock markets tend to experience a greater and significantly 
positive (negative) price response than additions (deletions) from the developed markets. 
Further tests reveal that the price reactions following DJIMWI revisions are likely to be 
driven by shifts in investor sentiment rather than changes in firm fundamentals.  
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1. Introduction 
Socially responsible investment (SRI) has become a major investment vehicle within the fund 
management industry over the past few decades. In addition to the conventional financial 
characteristics, such as risk and return, SRIs consider a corporation’s relationship with society 
and its ethical principles as an integral part of the investment decision making (Nainggolan et 
al., 2015). One of the most controversial issues surrounding SRIs is whether the selection of 
investments based on ethical and social performance criteria has a bearing on the wealth 
maximisation objective of investors. To address this issue, most existing studies focus on 
comparing the financial performance of ethically screened funds to their conventional 
counterparts (see, e.g., Mallin et al., 1995; Renneboog et al., 2008; Abdelsalam et al., 2014). 
Unfortunately, however, the results to date have been mixed. Some studies show that ethical 
funds have underperformed both non-ethical funds and the market in general (Mallin et al., 
1995). Others find that ethical funds outperform conventional funds during crisis periods, but 
underperform them in non-crisis periods (Nofsinger and Varma, 2014), and still others report 
no significant difference between the performance of SRI funds and conventional funds (Leite 
and Ceu Cortez, 2014).     
 In this study, we investigate the performance consequences of ethical outlays from a 
different perspective. Our analysis focuses on the stock market reactions to the Dow Jones 
Islamic Market World Index (DJIMWI) quarterly revisions. The DJIMWI is an ethical index 
which screens its investments for adherence to Islamic law. Its screening criteria are bound by 
well-defined religious guidelines, which help funds avoid investing in firms that engage in 
haram, riba, maysir, or gharar activities1. For instance, companies whose core business 
involves alcohol, conventional financial services, entertainment, pork-related products, tobacco 
or weapons are excluded from the index. Furthermore, companies with a debt level of more 
than one third of their market capitalisation are excluded (Hussein and Omran, 2005). Because 
of these stringent criteria, examining the price reactions to the DJIMWI quarterly revisions 
should shed light on whether the market places substance on companies’ commitment to ethics 
and compliance with Shari’ah principles. Furthermore, investigating the changes in the return 
comovement structure around revision events should help us understand whether the price 
reaction is due to changes in firms’ fundamentals or shifts in investor sentiment.  
 Our analysis is based on a sample of 8,250 companies (4,378 additions and 3,872 
deletions) from 18 countries from May 1999 through June 2012 and yields several interesting 
                                                          
1 Haram, riba, maysi and gharar are the Arabic words for sin, interest, gambling, speculation and uncertainty, 
respectively. 
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findings. First, we report significantly positive (negative) abnormal returns following additions 
to (deletions from) the DJIMWI. This suggests that investors perceive adherence to Islamic law 
as good news. This evidence contradicts the neo-classical view that ethical screening inhibits 
the wealth maximisation of investors (Luther et al., 1994) and supports the alternative view that 
ethical screening is unlikely to be costly as it is a form of behaviour that does not restrict itself 
to a particular grouping (Cullis et al., 1992). Second, we find that the market reactions to the 
DJIMWI revision announcements are significant and particularly strong for event stocks that 
are listed in developing stock markets. While, in theory, the DJIMWI selection criteria are 
based on publicly available information, investors’ access to such information may depend on 
the disclosure and regulatory requirements of the exchange in which the event firm is listed. 
Companies listed in developed countries with well-functioning stock markets are typically 
better known to investors and more likely to be followed by analysts than those listed in less 
developed markets. Thus, the DJIMWI revision announcements are more likely to surprise the 
market when an event stock is listed in a less developed country than in a more developed one. 
Finally, we report a significant increase (decrease) in the comovement of the newly added 
(deleted) stocks with the existing constituents of the DJIMWI after controlling for changes in 
firms’ fundamentals, including size, book to market, leverage and return on equity. This finding 
suggests the comovement is likely to reflect the common sentiment of ethical investors rather 
than changes in firms’ fundamentals. 
 Our study makes three important contributions to the literature. First, we provide multi-
country analysis of the price reactions to additions to and deletions from the DJIMWI, an 
ethical index which screens its investments for adherence to Islamic law. Although Islamic 
financial services have attracted the attention of academics, existing studies focus mainly on 
comparing the performance of Islamic funds to that of conventional funds and other 
benchmarks. Similar to other ethical funds, the results on the performance of Shari’ah-
compliant funds have been mixed. For example, Nainggolan, How and Verhoeven (2015) 
document that Islamic equity funds underperform conventional funds by about 4.8% per 
annum, and Ashraf (2014) finds that the performance of Islamic equity indices is not 
significantly different from their conventional counterparts, while Annuar et al. (1997) show 
that Shari’ah-compliant funds outperform the market index. This study contributes to literature 
by using market reactions around ethical index revision events as an alternative approach to 
investigate the value relevance of ethical screening. The significantly positive (negative) 
abnormal returns associated with additions to (deletions from) the DJIMWI suggests that 
investors perceive ethical screening as a source of value creation.  
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 Second, we identify ethical screening as a new source of stock return comovement. 
Several studies use additions to major market indices, such as the S&P 500 (e.g. Barberis et al., 
2005; Vijh, 1994) and FTSE 100 (e.g. Coakley and Kougoulis, 2004; Mase, 2007), to study 
stock return comovement. They argue that since these revision events are information free, any 
change in the comovement structure in the post-revision periods should be attributed to investor 
sentiment. However, one major weakness of these studies is that the revision events associated 
with the major indices may not be entirely information free (e.g. Cai, 2007; Kaul et al., 2000; 
Brisker et al., 2013). The DJIMWI revisions, which are based on well-defined, publicly 
available, religious guidelines, provide an ideal context for testing the role of ethical investor 
sentiment in stock returns. We attribute the significant increase (decrease) in the return 
comovement following additions to (deletions from) the DJIMWI to the trading behaviour of 
ethical investors who share common sentiment.  
 Finally, we show that the market reactions to the DJIMWI revisions depend on the level 
of development of the event stock’s country of origin. The effect of financial market 
development on stock price behaviour has been widely documented. For instance, Lasfer et al. 
(2003) show that stocks in more developed markets adjust quickly to large shocks. Titman et al. 
(2013) and Watanabe et al. (2013) find that the anomalous relationship between asset growth 
and subsequent returns is stronger in less developed markets. We contribute to this strand of the 
literature by analysing the relationship between development of the financial market and the 
price reaction to the ethically screened stocks. We find that investors from less developed 
markets react more strongly to the DJIMWI revisions than their counterparts from developed 
stock markets. This suggests the speed of price adjustment to ethical news depends largely on 
the level of stock market development. 
           The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature, while methodology 
and data are discussed in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Results and analysis are presented in 
Section 5 and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
One of the recent innovations and/or developments in finance is the rise of Islamic 
financial services around the world. McKinsey Management Consulting documents that 
“Islamic finance is the new force in the financial market”. Many financial institutions such as 
Citibank, Barclays, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch and HSBC sell Islamic financial products 
(Hassan and Girard, 2008), with the total value of Shari’ah-compliant assets reaching $939 
billion at start of 2011 (Walkshäusl and Lobe, 2012). The growth of Shari’ah-compliant 
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instruments has led major stocks exchanges, such as New York and London, to launch 
indices that track the performance of firms that conform to the Islamic investing rules. These 
Islamic indices represent a fairly homogenous class of ethical equity funds which screen their 
investments to rule out sinful stocks (e.g. alcohol, gambling and tobacco) and apply further 
financial ratio filters (e.g. such as gearing and interest paid and received) to comply with the 
Shari’ah rules2.    
 The noticeable increase in ethical and Shari’ah-compliant securities has attracted 
considerable attention from in the literature. One of the most contentious issues is whether 
constraining investments by ethical and religious filters have a bearing on financial 
performance. Some argue that ethical screening reduces the investment universe available to 
investors and yields a mean-variance efficient frontier that is less optimal than the one 
available to the conventional investors (Nainggolan et al., 2014). However, others maintain 
that screening potential investment opportunities with both financial and ethical criteria 
makes positive social and economic contributions. By screening potential investments, ethical 
investors ensure that the investments they select are consistent with their personal values, 
raise awareness to firms that are not responsive to ethical concerns and put pressure on 
unresponsive firms to social and ethical concerns to change (Sauer, 1997). Further, a 
company that adopts and implements an effective corporate responsibility policy may be 
better positioned to avoid any environmental and social crises that could lead to reputation 
damage among other issues. Environmentally superior products can also contribute to the 
product differentiation and develop strength in customer’s loyalty (Webley et al., 2001). 
Ethical behaviour may also help firms to attract and retain talented employees, cut 
recruitment costs and remain ahead of the competition (Renneboog et al., 2008).  
  Given the theoretical ambiguity of the impact of ethical screening on portfolio 
performance, several studies have attempted to address this issue empirically. A common 
approach in the empirical literature is to compare the performance of ethical and religious 
funds with that of their conventional counterparts. Unfortunately, evidence from these studies 
is also not conclusive. For example, Hussein and Omran (2005) find that Dow Jones Islamic 
indices outperform conventional ones, particularly during bull markets (January 1996 – 
March 2000). Similarly, Aka (2009) shows that the MSCI World Islamic index significantly 
outperformed the MSCI All World index by more than 15% in 2004-2009. He concludes that 
the main benefit of adherence to Shari’ah principles is that the returns on investment tend to 
                                                          
2 See Section 4 for more details on the selection applied by the DJIMWI. 
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be subject to less volatility and are likely to be cushioned against large market swings relative 
to conventional indices.  Al-Rifai (2012) also reports that, during the last financial crisis, the 
Dow Jones Islamic indices outperformed their conventional counterparts. This may be 
explained by the fact that Islamic indices exclude highly geared firms and tend to attach 
greater weight to sectors such as healthcare, oil and gas and technology. They also exclude 
sectors such as entertainment and financial services, which were highly affected in the last 
financial crisis. Ho et al. (2014) also find that 12 Islamic indices from 8 countries 
outperformed their comparable conventional indices during crisis periods but the findings for 
non-crisis periods are not conclusive.  In contrast, Hakim and Rashidian (2002) find that the 
conventional Wilshire 5000 index outperformed the Dow Jones Islamic Market index and the 
two indices appear to be completely unrelated to each other over time. Albaity and Ahmad 
(2008) also report that the Kuala Lumpur Syariah index (KLSI) underperformed (though 
marginally) the Kuala Lumpur Composite index (KLCI) from April 1999 through December 
2006. Dharani and Natarajan (2011) report that Indian Islamic indices (Nifty Shari’ah) do as 
well as their conventional counterparts (Nifty index). The lack of difference in performance 
between the two types of indices is also reported by Ashraf (2014) and Hassan and Girard 
(2011). Charles, Darne and Pop (2015) find that the Dow Jones Islamic Market index was 
affected by the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 in the same way as conventional indices. 
  In this study, we deviate from the existing literature by evaluating the value relevance 
of ethical screening around Islamic index revisions. Several hypotheses have been advanced 
in the literature to explain the price impact of additions and deletions on major stock market 
indices, such as the S&P 500 and FTSE 100. First is the downward-sloping demand 
hypothesis, which suggests that a company’s inclusion in an index results in an increase in 
demand for its stock from index funds. This, in turn, leads to upward price pressure in both 
the short and long run (Shleifer, 1986; Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997). This hypothesis is 
supported by empirical studies that have, for example, examined the S&P 500 (Harris and 
Gurel, 1986; Chan et al., 2013) and the FTSE 100 index (Opong and Hamill, 2004; Mase, 
2007). Second, the price pressure hypothesis posits that index funds execute sizeable trade 
orders (purchase-added and sell-deleted stocks) around index revisions. This causes the prices 
of the affected stocks to temporarily move away from their equilibrium (Harris and Gurel, 
1986). Using data relating to the FTSE 100 index revisions for 1984-2003, Mazouz and 
Saadouni (2007a) provide evidence in support of the price pressure hypothesis. Third, the 
liquidity hypothesis suggests that the liquidity of the added (deleted) stocks will improve 
(deteriorate) as a result of the index revision. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that 
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there will be greater scrutiny by investment analysts, the media and the managers of  index 
funds. This should lead to a decline in information asymmetry, which in turn should result in 
a decline in the liquidity premium. The decline in the liquidity premium should lead to a 
positive (negative) price response of the added (deleted) stocks. This hypothesis is supported 
by empirical studies that have, for example, examined the S&P 500 (Becker-Blease and Paul, 
2006) and the Dow Jones Index (Beneish and Gardner, 1995). Finally, the investor 
recognition hypothesis suggests that additions to a major index help to increase investors’ 
awareness about the firm, lower its shadow cost and increase its price (Chen et al., 2004).  
Some studies examine the change in the comovement structure around index revisions 
(e.g. Barberies et al., 2005; Mase, 2007; Claessens and Yafeh, 2012), while others investigate 
the stock price reactions (see Oberndorfer et al., 2013). Although all of these studies report 
increased (decreased) comovement between newly added (deleted) stocks and the rest of the 
index, the reasons for this effect are still being debated, with many alternative theories 
reported. Barberies et al. (2005) argue that if S&P 500 revisions are information-free events, 
comovement changes following additions to (deletions from) the indices are more likely to be 
driven by shifts in investor sentiment than changes in firm fundamentals.  While our study 
also investigates the price reaction and the comovement changes around index revisions, it 
differs from previous studies in a number of ways. First, ethical screening by Islamic indices 
differs from the screening of conventional indices, such as the S&P 500 or FTSE 100, as the 
selection criteria are bound by well-defined religious guidelines. Thus, investigating the 
market reactions to DJIMWI index revisions contributes to our understanding of the value 
relevance of ethical investments. Second, the DJIMWI index revision is based on publicly 
available information, while the assumption that conventional index revisions contain no 
information about firms’ fundamentals has been challenged (e.g. Denis et al., 2003; Cai, 
2007). Thus, the DJIMWI provides an ideal setting to test the comovement theories in an 
environment in which index changes do not carry any news about fundamentals. Finally, the 
constituents of the DJIMWI are drawn from stock markets that vary in terms of development 
and regulatory regimes and this provides a unique opportunity to examine the relationship 
between development of the financial market and price reactions to ethical screening. 
 
3. Methodology 
The daily abnormal returns of the individual stock i in a country j around an addition or 
deletion event date is estimated using the following equation: 
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t,j,it,j,hht,j,sst,j,mbit,j,i HMLSMBRR HEEED               (1) 
Equation (1) is estimated over a minimum 50-day window ending 16 days before the 
announcement date for each portfolio company in a country j. Ri,j,t  is the continuously 
compounded return adjusted for dividend for stock i, country j at time t; Rm,j,t is the 
logarithmic return of the local market index in country j at time t; βb  is the market beta. 
SMBs,j,t is the difference between the excess return on a portfolio of small stocks and the 
excess return on a portfolio of big stocks in country j at time t; βs is the SMB factor load. 
HMLh,j,t is the difference between the excess return on a portfolio of high-book-to-market 
stocks and the excess return on a portfolio of low-book-to-market stocks in country j at time t, 
βh is the HML factor, while εi,j,t is the error term. 
  We construct proxies for SMB and HML to control for the size and growth when 
estimating the daily abnormal returns for each country in our sample. The SMB proxy is 
constructed as follows: First, we rank all stocks for each country’s local index constituents by 
firm size. Second, we assign stocks to two portfolios; one portfolio contains the 50% of stocks 
with highest market capitalisation (Big (B)) and the other includes the 50% of stocks with the 
lowest market capitalisation (Small (S)). Third, we form three portfolios (i.e. low, medium 
and high) from the highest 50% and three from the lowest 50%.  Finally, we calculate the 
SMB as the daily difference between three small stocks portfolios (i.e. lowest 50%) and three 
big stocks portfolios (i.e. highest 50%).  For the HML proxy, we construct three portfolios 
(top 30%, middle 40% and bottom 30%) based on book to market.  Next, we calculate the 
HML as the difference between two high-book-to-market stock portfolios and low-book-to-
market stock portfolios.  
 Equation (1) is estimated using the standard GARCH (1, 1) framework to allow the 
variance of the residual term (εi,j,t) to be systematic over time. Several studies find that 
controlling for the heteroscedasticity in the residuals improves the market model parameter 
estimates and the power of the statistical tests (see, e.g., Corhay and Rad, 1996; Savickas, 
2003; Hahn and Reyes, 2004). The conditional variance of εi,j,t in Equation (1), hi,j,t, is  
modelled as follows: 
 1t,j,ij,i1t,j,i
2
j,ij,it,j,i hh   OHJM        (2) 
φi,j is defined as the permanent component of the conditional variance; γi,j is the ARCH term 
and can be interpreted as information about the volatility observed from the previous period; 
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λi,j is the GARCH term, which is the forecast variance from the last period or the impact of 
the old news on today's volatility.  
The price reaction to additions (deletions) is measured using the average abnormal 
returns (ARt) on a given day t and the cumulative abnormal return (CARs) over a window of 
s days, specified as follows: 
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Savickas's (2003) GARCH-based statistic to test whether the average daily abnormal returns 
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The GARCH test follows student’s t distribution with N-1 degrees of freedom. The 
GARCH-based statistic measures whether the average abnormal return observed over a 
window of length s is statistically significant3. 
 Next we examine the comovements of the stocks that are added to or deleted from 
the DJIMWI. Consistent with Barberis et al. (2005), we first estimate the following 
univariate regressions for each event stock in every country in the sample: 
 
 
  t,i,jt,IslamiciIslamic,ji,jt,i,j RR HED    (3) 
                                                          
3 A similar approach is used by Oberndorfer et al. (2013). As robustness, we use the adjusted PATELL test 
suggested by Kolari and Pynnonen (2010) to correct for cross-correlation and the results are robust. We have 
used SAS to estimate Savickas's (2003) and PATELL test statistics. 
10 
 
We estimate Equation (3) by country and separately for the period before and after each 
addition and deletion event. tijR ,,  is the return on the event stock , while tiIslamicR ,,  is the 
return on the DJIMWI. The pre-event period runs over 12 months ending 1 month before the 
revision announcement date, and the post-event period spans 12 months starting a month 
after the announcement date. We then estimate a bivariate regression of the following form: 
t,i,jLocalt,i,Local,jt,i,IslamicIslamic,ji,jt,i,j RRR HEED    (4) 
where RLocal,I,t is the return of the main local index of country j in which stock i is originated. 
We estimate Equation (4) separately for the 12-month period before and the 12-month 
period after each revision event.  We run the regression over 12-month periods before and 
after the event and record the pre- and post-revision values of Islamicj ,E  and Localj ,E . 
While the DJIMWI revision criteria are unlikely to carry signals about fundamentals, 
firm characteristics are not constant over time and may change following revision events. 
Thus, to control for the contemporaneous changes in firm fundamentals across pre- and 
post-decision, we estimate the following model4:  
  
eLEV
IVSROEBTMMVCOMV
5
43210
'
'''' '
J
JJJJJ  (5) 
 
where  refers to the change that is the post-index revision minus the pre-index revision 
value in a given variable;  is measured by the parameter  in Equation (4); 
 is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation  at the fiscal year end;  is the log of 
the book-to-market equity ratio, computed as the book value of equity scaled by the market 
value at the fiscal year-end;   is a profitability measure computed as earnings divided by 
equity book value; is capital expenditure scaled by total assets; and  is the sum of 
short-term and long-term debts scaled by the total book value of assets. We include the 
above variables as controls in Equation (5) because Fama and French (2015) show that size, 
value, profitability and investment are the main determinants of stock returns. Several other 
studies also show that leverage affects stock returns (see, e.g., George and Hwang, 2010). 
 
                                                          
4 A similar approach is used by Claessens and Yafeh (2012) and Eun et al. (2015) in the context of periodic 
revision of the conventional stock indices.  
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4. Data 
The list of additions and deletions is obtained from Dow Jones Company5. Our sample 
includes all firms that are added to (deleted from) the DJIMWI between  May 1999 and June 
2012. The selection process of DJIMWI consists of two stages. The first stage involves the 
filtering of companies on the basis of industry sector. To be considered for possible inclusion 
in the DJIMWI, the company’s primary business activity must not be incompatible with 
Islamic principles. For instance, firms whose business activity includes pork, tobacco, 
alcohol, conventional banks and insurance, alcohol, arms/defence and leisure (e.g. gambling, 
pornography, hotels, media) are considered incompatible with Shari’ah law. The second stage 
entails the filtering of companies on the basis of financial ratios that are viewed as 
incompatible with Shari’ah investment guidelines. The financial ratios as per Shari’ah 
compliance are gearing (total debt/two-year moving average market capitalisation) and cash 
ratios; both must be less than 33%.  The cash compliance ratios are calculated as (i) cash and 
interest-bearing securities divided by two-year moving average market capitalisation and (ii) 
accounts receivable deflated by two-year moving average market capitalisation. The 
screening methodology is subject to approval by an independent Shari’ah supervisory board.  
  Our initial data consist of a  total of 14,092 revision events, 7,751 additions and 6,341 
deletions. For our analysis, we require that either DataStream or Sedol codes be available so 
as to obtain daily stock prices and accounting data for firms in our sample by country of 
origin. Market and accounting data are important for our analysis in terms of investigating the 
impact of changes in firms’ fundamentals and calculating proxies for SMB and HML, 
respectively. We exclude from our sample 448 additions and 404 deletions because either the 
DataStream or the Sedol code is not available. To construct portfolio returns at a country 
level, we require each country to have at least 15 companies added to and/or deleted from the 
index. Furthermore, each company must have daily stock prices at least 50 days prior to the 
index revision and up to 7 days after the revision. These sample selection requirements yields 
a final sample of 8,250 companies (4,378 additions and 3,872 deletions) for 18 countries.  We 
control for the exchange rate disparity between the currencies of the 18 countries using the 
US dollar as the base currency.  Furthermore, we classify counties in our sample into 
developed and developing countries using the World Bank country classification6.  
                                                          
5 We are grateful to Dow Jones Company for providing us the data and the announcement dates for additions 
and deletions from the Dow Jones Islamic Market World Index. 
6http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2014wesp_country_classification.pdf 
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5. Results and Analysis 
5.1. The price effect 
Table 1 displays the frequency and the proportion of the addition and deletion samples. Panel 
A of Table 1 shows the results for the added and deleted sample by country of origin. Panel B 
presents the mean and median values of the market capitalisation for the added and deleted 
companies. Panel A shows that the number of firms added to (deleted from) the DJIMWI is 
dominated by firms from the US, Japan, Taiwan, Canada, Australia, UK and Hong Kong. 
Companies from these seven countries represent 85% of the total sample. Egypt and 
Indonesia are the only two Muslim countries in the sample, with a combined weight of about 
2%. The proportion of companies from Muslim countries in the DJIMWI declines in May 
2016 to only about 1%7. The mean (median) market capitalisation of the added (deleted) 
companies in Panel B suggests that event firms tend to be large. The mean (median) values of 
the firms added to the DJIMWI ranges between $114 M ($84.8 M) in the case of Egypt and 
$7310 M ($6170 M) in the case of Germany. By contrast, for the deleted sample the mean 
value is in the range of $111 M to $ 6170 M, while the median value is between $73.6 M and 
$ 1180 M. Overall, Panel B in Table 1 shows that the market capitalisation of the sub-
samples of the added and deleted stocks is comparable.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TABLE 1 HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 2 shows the CAR associated with the ethically screened stocks that are added 
to the DJIMWI. We choose to focus on the short-term event windows to avoid the potential 
effect of changes in firm characteristics on our abnormal return estimates. The results are 
reported by country and the CARs are measured over [0,+1], [0,+2], [-3,+3], [-5,+5] and [-
7,+7] windows around the additions. The CARs are computed using the three-factor model 
with GARCH (1, 1) to control for possible ARCH effects in the residuals of the factor 
model8. We use a country's main stock market index as the benchmark return in the three-
factor model. We report positive and significant price reactions following additions to the 
DJIMWI in all countries in our sample except Canada, where CARs are negative but not 
statistically significant. We also find that firms based in Muslim countries, namely, Egypt 
                                                          
7https://www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/downloads/fact_info/Dow_Jones_Islamic_Market_World_Index_Fact_She
et.pdf 
 
8 The factor loadings of the three-factor model by country are reported in the Appendix. 
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and Indonesia, exhibit the highest positive price reaction after joining the DJIMWI. For 
Egyptian firms, the CARs range between the lowest of 1.3% over the [0,+1] window to the 
highest of 2.8% over the [-3,+3] window. For Indonesia, the lowest CAR of 2.3% is 
observed over the [0,+1] and [-7,+7] windows, while the highest CAR of 6.3% is measured 
over the [-5,+5] window.  On average, sample firms from the remaining countries show 
varying positive price reactions (depending on the estimation window) ranging between 
0.1% and 1.4%. We further report the average CARs associated with additions to DJIMWI 
for the full sample and for the subsamples of developed and developing countries. Table 2 
shows that the average CARs for these subsamples are positive and significant across the 
various estimation windows. The results  also reveal that the positive price reaction is 
significantly higher for developing countries than developed ones. This is consistent with the 
view that stocks from developed markets adjust faster to public information, including those 
relating to ethicality, than their counterparts from developing markets (see, e.g., Lasfer et al., 
2003; Titman et al., 2013; Watanabe et al., 2013). 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TABLE 2 HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Next, we examine the announcement effect associated with deletions from the 
DJIMWI. Table 3 shows that the CARs following deletion events are negative for all 
countries and across all estimation windows. It also shows that the negative price reactions 
are stronger in developing countries. The highest significant CAR over the [0, +1] window is 
reported in Indonesia (-2.3%), followed by Egypt (-1.2%), Hong Kong (-1.1%) and Japan (-
0.5%).  The CARs over the [0, +1] window associated with the remaining sample countries 
are not significant. The number of countries with significantly negative CARs increases 
considerably (from 4 to 10) when CARs are measured over the [-5, +5] window around the 
deletion announcement dates. The CARs over the [-7, +7] window are also negative, but only 
(weakly) significant in 6 of the 18 sample countries. The significantly negative CARs over 
the [-7, +7] window range from -2.6% for India to -0.01% for Chile.  
The last three rows of Table 3 present the average CARs associated with deletions 
from the DJIMWI for the full sample and for the subsamples of developed and developing 
countries. The average CARs associated with the full sample are negative and significant, 
varying from -0.5% to -0.8% across various study windows. The average CARs associated 
with the subsamples of developing and developed countries are also negative and significant 
across all windows, except for the [-7, +7] window in which the average CARs for 
developing countries are insignificant. The last row of Table 3 shows that the magnitude of 
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the negative CARs associated with deletions is significantly higher for developing countries 
than developed ones; again this may reflect the slow reaction of  developing stock markets to 
public information announcements (see, e.g., Lasfer et al., 2003; Titman et al., 2013; 
Watanabe et al., 2013).    
In sum, the results indicate that investors perceive additions to (deletions from) the 
DJIMWI as good (bad) news. This evidence is consistent with view that ethical 
considerations in investment decisions is a source of value creation (see, e.g., Renneboog et 
al., 2008; Webley et al., 2001) and contradicts with the notion that ethical and religious 
filtering produces a suboptimal mean-variance efficient frontier and inferior financial 
performance (Nainggolan et al., 2014).  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TABLE 3 HERE  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
5.2. The comovement effect 
Table 4 reports the comovement between the ethically screened stocks that are added to 
(deleted from) the DJIMWI with the constituents of the index using univariate analysis 
(Equation (3)). The results show a significant increase (decrease) in the comovement of the 
newly added (deleted) stocks with the existing DJIMWI constituents. The changes in the 
comovement following additions range from 0.693 in Indonesia to 0.0615 in Greece.  
Overall, our results confirm that stocks exhibit a strong and significant increase (decrease) in 
their betas following additions to (deletions from) the DJIMWI. Furthermore, we find that 
changes in the R2 for the additions are positive and significant across all countries, indicating 
a stronger correlation between the newly added stocks and the existing constituents of the 
DJIMWI following additions. The results for the changes in betas and R2 also hold for the 
full sample and when we partition the sample into developed and developing countries.   
Table 4 also presents the changes in the comovement structure following deletions 
from DJIMWI using the univariate regression analysis. The univariate results show that 
changes in the slopes are negative and statistically significant for the stocks deleted from the 
index. The greatest (in absolute terms) change in comovement is when Brazilian firms leave 
the DJIMWI (-0.642), while the lowest change in comovement is reported in the case of 
Taiwanese firms (-0.0168). We also find that changes in the R2 are positive in all countries, 
but statistically insignificant, except for Greece and Italy. This outcome suggests that the 
correlation between the deleted stocks and the Islamic index remains unchanged after the 
post-deletion period. This finding is consistent with the recognition hypothesis of Chen et al. 
(2004), who suggest that the benefits of index membership are permanent, as investors’ 
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awareness increases after additions but does not decline after deletions. This may also reflect 
the slow portfolio rebalancing of DJIMWI trackers following the deletion events. The last 
three rows of Table 4 show that the average change in betas following deletions associated 
with the full sample and the subsamples of developed and developing countries is also 
negative and significant, while the average change in R2 is statistically insignificant. 
Overall, our results suggest that since DJIMWI revision decisions are based on 
publicly available information, the changes in betas and R2 following the revision events may 
reflect the common behaviour of ethical investors rather than changes in firm fundamentals. 
Several studies in the social science literature suggest that religiosity affects individual 
values, beliefs and economic choices (e.g. Lehrer, 2004; Shukor and Jamal, 2013; Vitell, 
2009). While prior literature does not suggest that religious adherence is the only source of 
ethical behaviour (Kurpis et al., 2008; Peterson et al., 2010), it clearly demonstrate that 
religiosity is positively associated with ethical behaviour (Webley, 1996). Thus, if DJIMWI 
investors share common ethical believes, their correlated demand would induce a common 
factor in stock returns, causing comovement among the index constituents.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TABLE 4 HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Table 5 presents the results of the bivariate regression (Equation (4)). We find that the 
comovement of newly added stocks with the DJIMWI increases, while their comovement 
with the local index decreases in the post-addition period, and vice versa for the newly 
deleted stocks. The results show that the changes in comovement with DJIMWI associated 
with both additions and deletions are significant across all countries and are stronger than 
those reported in Table 4. Our results remain robust when we group the sample countries into 
developed and developing. These findings are not consistent with the fundamental-based 
view, which suggests that since the DJIMWI revision criteria do not carry news about 
changes in firm fundamentals, changes in the DJIMWI and local index betas should not be 
statistically different from zero. However, the results provide strong support for the 
sentiment-based view, which suggests that correlated demand shocks of ethical investors, 
who track the DJIMWI, alter the comovement between newly added/deleted stocks with the 
existing constituents of the DJIMWI and the local index.    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TABLE 5 HERE  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
To shed further light on whether the changes in the comovements are due to changes 
in investor sentiment or changes in firm fundamentals, we estimate Equation (5). The results 
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are shown in Table 6. Panel A reports the results from the sample of additions. The intercept 
of Equation (5) is significantly positive for all countries in the sample, suggesting that firm 
fundamentals cannot fully explain the shifts in the comovement structure in the post-addition 
period. The coefficients on the fundamental factors are also generally insignificant, with the 
exception of Canada, Chile, Finland, Greece, Japan and Spain, where some fundamental 
factors seem to have weak explanatory power. Nonetheless, changes in firm fundamentals do 
not explain changes in the comovements across different markets. For instance, in Canada, 
changes in the leverage explain changes in the comovements, while in Chile, Finland and 
Greece it is changes to the book-to-market ratio that explain the comovements. 
In Panel B, we repeat the analysis for the sample of deletions. Similar to the results 
reported in Panel A, the intercept of Equation (5) is significant and the changes in the firm 
fundamentals are weakly associated with the changes in the comovements. We also do not 
find any consistent patterns to indicate that specific changes in firm fundamentals explain 
changes in the comovements. For example, the change in comovement is explained by 
changes in leverage in Australia, changes in ROE in Finland and changes in size and 
investments in the US. 
Overall, consistent with our earlier findings, the results in Table 6 also indicate that 
the changes in the price behaviour following the DJIMWI index revisions are likely to be 
driven by the correlated demand of ethical investors, who may share common sentiment. 
Because of its adherence to Islamic law, the DJIMWI may not only attract Muslim investors, 
but also attract other investors who value high ethical standards. As many of the DJIMWI 
trackers share common code of ethics, their coordinated trading behaviour may induce a 
common sentiment to stock returns and therefore cause the constituents of the index to 
commove.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TABLE 6 HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
6. Conclusion 
The exponential growth in ethical investments, which include both socially responsible 
investment (SRI) and faith-based funds, over the past two decades, has attracted significant 
attention in the literature. One of the most contentious issues relates to the potential impact of 
ethical restrictions on the financial performance of these investment vehicles. Some argue 
that ethically screened stocks represent a very constrained  investment universe and perhaps 
limits potential diversifications (e.g., Nainggolan et al., 2014). Others maintain that investing 
in ethically screened stocks can create value by helping firms to secure competitive edge 
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(Porter and Kramer, 2006). This paper investigates the short-term price reactions of ethically 
screened stocks. Our analysis is based on the premise that since the DJIMWI revision 
decisions do not convey new information about firm fundamentals, any reaction to the 
DJIMWI quarterly revisions should reflect the extent to which the market places substance on 
firms’ commitment to ethics and Shari’ah principles. Using DJIMWI revisions, we find that 
the markets react positively around the announcement for stocks that are added to the index 
and negatively to stocks that are deleted from the index. The CARs associated with the 
sample of additions (deletions) range between 0.7% and 1.3% (0.5% and 0.8%). This finding 
suggests that investors perceive firms’ commitment to ethics and Shari’ah law as good news. 
In other words, investors believe that ethical compliance is likely to be a source of value 
creation rather than a diversification constraint. We also find that the market reaction is 
stronger when the event stock is listed in less developed stock markets. We attribute this 
finding to the information opacity of the developing markets. Specifically, stocks in 
developing countries are typically less known to investors and less likely to be followed by 
analysts, and investors are more likely to be surprised when such stocks join a major index.  
We also investigate the change in the stock return comovement following the 
DJIMWI revisions. We find that the betas of the added (deleted) stocks exhibit a strong and 
significant increase (decrease) in post-revision periods. These results are even stronger when 
we control for the comovement with the local index and are robust across developed and 
developing markets. Finally, we use multivariate regression analysis to shed further light on 
whether the changes in the price behaviour following the revision events are driven by 
changes investor sentiment  or by changes in firm fundamentals. We find that changes in the 
firm fundamental characteristics, such as size, book to market value and leverage, do not 
explain the shifts in the comovement structure following the index revisions. These findings 
suggest that changes in the price behaviour following index revisions are likely to reflect the 
sentiment of ethical investors rather than changes in firm fundamentals. Since many of the 
DJIMWI trackers share common code of ethics, their trading behaviour and coordinated 
demand is likely to induce a common factor in stock returns and therefore cause strong 
comovement among the index constituents.  
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Table 1: Sample distribution and market capitalisation by country. Panel A shows the distribution, while Panel 
B shows the market capitalisation in US$ of the added and deleted stocks. Market capitalisation is calculated as 
the market price in US$ times the total number of outstanding shares and the figures are reported in millions. 
Developed countries include Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Spain, UK and 
US. Developing countries include Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia and Taiwan. 
Panel A: Distribution of added and deleted companies  by country 
  
Added firms 
 
Deleted firms 
Country 
 
Freq 
 
Proportion 
 
Freq 
 
Proportion 
     #   %    #   % 
Australia 
 
333 
 
7.6 
 
263 
 
6.8 
Canada 
 
436 
 
10.0 
 
338 
 
8.7 
Finland 
 
40 
 
0.9 
 
31 
 
0.8 
France 
 
69 
 
1.6 
 
75 
 
1.9 
Germany 
 
110 
 
2.5 
 
101 
 
2.6 
Greece 
 
44 
 
1.0 
 
46 
 
1.2 
Italy 
 
55 
 
1.3 
 
58 
 
1.5 
Japan 
 
756 
 
17.3 
 
704 
 
18.2 
Spain 
 
32 
 
0.7 
 
32 
 
0.8 
UK 
 
304 
 
6.9 
 
264 
 
6.8 
US 
 
1148 
 
26.2 
 
1230   31.8 
Brazil 
 
44 
 
1.0 
 
37 
 
1.0 
Chile 
 
42 
 
1.0 
 
34 
 
0.9 
Egypt 
 
36 
 
0.8 
 
18 
 
0.5 
Hong Kong 
 
284 
 
6.5 
 
234 
 
6.0 
India 
 
119 
 
2.7 
 
29 
 
0.7 
Indonesia 
 
52 
 
1.2 
 
33 
 
0.9 
Taiwan 
 
474 
 
10.8 
 
345 
 
8.9 
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Table 1 continues 
Panel B: Market cap of added and deleted companies  by country 
     
  
Added firms 
 
Deleted firms 
  
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
Australia 
 
1220 
 
408 
 
1330 
 
438 
Canada 
 
1610 
 
590 
 
1840 
 
565 
Finland 
 
2350 
 
1520 
 
1550 
 
1160 
France 
 
6500 
 
1730 
 
5760 
 
1260 
Germany 
 
7310 
 
1250 
 
6170 
 
1180 
Greece 
 
1380 
 
895 
 
917 
 
265 
Italy 
 
4370 
 
1350 
 
4370 
 
1090 
Japan 
 
2020 
 
588 
 
1920 
 
548 
Spain 
 
3980 
 
1780 
 
4470 
 
1510 
UK 
 
3730 
 
1260 
 
3720 
 
1070 
US   4260 
 
1550   4160   1420 
Brazil 
 
4270 
 
830 
 
5720 
 
1160 
Chile 
 
1350 
 
699 
 
1070 
 
628 
Egypt 
 
114 
 
84.8 
 
111 
 
73.6 
Hong Kong 
 
875 
 
256 
 
826 
 
175 
India 
 
1150 
 
192 
 
586 
 
119 
Indonesia 
 
691 
 
271 
 
734 
 
156 
Taiwan 
 
583 
 
238 
 
557 
 
191 
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Table 2: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over different windows around additions to DJIMWI. The CARs 
are estimated using a three-factor model with the GARCH (1,1) framework. Developed countries include 
Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Spain, UK and US. Developing countries 
include Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia and Taiwan. The test is GARCH-based statistics and 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Country N CAR t-test CAR t-test CAR t-test CAR t-test CAR t-test 
     [0,+1]    [0,+2]   [-3,+3]    [-5,+5]    [-7,+7]   
Australia 333 0.004 1.071 0.004 1.537 0.006* 1.667 0.012** 3.208 0.002 1.577 
Canada 436 -0.006 -1.628 -0.001 -0.573 -0.009 -1.640 -0.001 -1.168 -0.005 -1.608 
Finland 40 0.005 1.135 0.003 1.351 0.004 1.177 0.005 1.254 0.004 1.500 
France 69 0.016** 2.855 0.018*** 3.481 0.019** 2.155 0.012** 2.336 0.023*** 5.584 
Germany 110 0.001 1.198 0.002 1.479 0.001 1.572 0.003 1.389 0.016*** 7.566 
Greece 44 0.002 0.497 0.006 1.519 0.008* 1.791 0.001 0.335 0.002 0.515 
Italy 55 0.001 0.187 0.008** 2.069 0.009** 2.645 0.014** 2.953 0.016** 2.241 
Japan 756 0.005* 1.762 0.002 1.143 0.001 1.198 0.003*** 3.465 0.001 1.295 
Spain 32 0.002 0.248 0.007 0.897 0.008 1.093 0.021** 2.803 0.002 0.314 
UK 304 0.005* 1.674 0.004 1.311 0.010*** 3.516 0.006** 2.304 0.014** 2.343 
US 1148 0.009* 1.735 0.008** 2.669 0.007* 1.881 0.004* 1.672 0.009* 1.713 
Brazil 44 0.005 1.494 0.009 1.609 0.001 0.379 0.007* 1.941 0.010** 2.732 
Chile 42 0.002 0.814 0.003 1.084 0.012*** 4.046 0.001 0.543 0.008* 1.846 
Egypt 36 0.013** 1.960 0.018*** 4.643 0.028*** 6.989 0.025** 2.536 0.014*** 3.781 
Hong Kong 284 0.011*** 3.469 0.009** 2.718 0.016*** 5.285 0.017** 2.001 0.021*** 9.867 
India 119 0.002 1.124 0.006* 1.744 0.005 1.598 0.025** 2.274 0.026*** 9.107 
Indonesia 52 0.023* 1.917 0.024** 2.491 0.034*** 4.694 0.063** 2.042 0.023*** 7.075 
Taiwan 474 0.008 1.601 0.010** 2.766 0.009** 2.600 0.014*** 3.876 0.016*** 7.115 
            
Full sample 4378 0.007*** 3.853 0.008*** 5.124 0.009*** 3.967 0.013*** 3.664 0.011*** 5.309 
Developed 3327 0.004*** 2.430 0.006*** 3.688 0.006** 2.781 0.007*** 3.636 0.008*** 2.963 
Developing 1051 0.009*** 3.258 0.011*** 4.118 0.015*** 3.292 0.022** 2.841 0.017*** 6.614 
Diff in CARs  -0.005 -1.581 -0.006* -1.836 -0.009* -1.831 -0.014* -1.828 -0.009** -2.544 
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Table 3: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over different windows following deletions from the DJIMWI. 
The CARs are estimated using a three-factor model with the GARCH (1, 1) framework. Developed countries 
include Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Spain, UK and US. Developing 
countries include Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia and Taiwan. The test is GARCH-based 
statistics and ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Country N CAR t-test CAR t-test CAR t-test CAR t-test CAR t-test 
     [0,+1]    [0,+2]   [-3,+3]    [-5,+5]    [-7,+7]   
Australia 263 -0.003 -1.626 -0.004 -1.537 -0.002 -1.222 -0.004*** -3.142 -0.002 -1.637 
Canada 338 -0.006 -1.611 -0.001 -1.563 -0.008 -1.611 -0.003 -1.634 -0.002 -1.622 
Finland 31 -0.005 -1.135 -0.003 -0.510 -0.004 -0.677 -0.003 -1.391 -0.004 -1.500 
France 75 -0.001 -0.102 -0.001 -1.161 -0.008 -1.552 -0.012** -2.336 -0.002 -1.584 
Germany 101 -0.001 -0.420 -0.002 -1.604 -0.001 -1.572 -0.010*** -4.572 -0.006 -1.578 
Greece 46 -0.002 -0.497 -0.006 -1.519 -0.008* -1.791 -0.001 -0.335 -0.002 -0.515 
Italy 58 0.001 0.187 -0.008** -2.102 -0.009** -2.645 -0.004 -1.353 -0.006 -1.241 
Japan 704 -0.005* -1.682 -0.002* -1.696 -0.001 -1.198 -0.003* -1.747 -0.001 -1.295 
Spain 32 -0.002 -0.248 -0.007 -0.897 0.008 1.093 -0.012 -1.597 -0.002 -1.135 
UK 264 -0.005 -1.474 -0.004 -1.311 -0.007** -2.270 -0.016** -2.154 -0.001 -0.492 
US 1230 -0.004 -1.635 -0.003 -1.646 -0.001 -1.198 -0.004* -1.772 -0.009* -1.883 
Brazil 37 -0.003 -0.945 -0.009 -1.009 -0.001 -0.379 -0.006 -1.492 -0.001* -1.673 
Chile 34 -0.002 -0.814 -0.003* -1.841 -0.012** -2.046 -0.013** -2.426 -0.008* -1.685 
Egypt 18 -0.012** -1.981 -0.018** -2.643 -0.014*** -3.546 -0.013*** -3.258 -0.010** -1.978 
Hong Kong 234 -0.011*** -3.469 -0.009** -2.718 -0.016** -2.285 -0.007** -2.805 -0.002 -0.987 
India 29 -0.002 -1.124 -0.006** -2.443 -0.005 -1.598 0.002 0.827 -0.026* -1.661 
Indonesia 33 -0.023** -1.997 -0.024** -2.491 -0.034*** -4.694 -0.014*** -14.876 -0.019* -1.771 
Taiwan 345 -0.008 -1.570 -0.010** -1.977 -0.011** -1.982 -0.013 -1.207 -0.002 -1.115 
            
Full sample 3872 -0.005*** -3.964 -0.007*** -4.699 -0.007*** -3.597 -0.008*** -6.005 -0.006*** -3.634 
Developed 3142 -0.003*** -4.541 -0.004*** -5.215 -0.004** -2.442 -0.007*** -4.353 -0.003*** -4.325 
Developing 731 -0.009*** -3.047 -0.011*** -4.118 -0.013*** -3.343 -0.009*** -4.120 -0.010 -0.009 
Diff in CARs  0.006* 1.947 0.008** 2.669 0.010** 2.245 0.003 0.969 0.006* 1.717 
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Table 4: Changes in the return comovement following DJIMWI revisions: The univariate analysis (Equation (3)).  E' Islamic is the mean change in slope across the event date 
and 2R'   is the mean change in goodness of fit. The pre-event and post-event estimation periods are [-12,-1] and [+1,+12] months. The t-test is adjusted for cross-correlation and 
reported next to the change in the slopes and ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Countries # of firms   Univariate (added sample)  # of firms Univariate (deleted sample) 
      E' Islamic t-test 2R'  t-test 
 
E' Islamic t-test 2R'  t-test 
Australia 333 
 
0.4787*** 16.58 0.0835*** 20.64 263 -0.0282** -2.22 0.0135 1.07 
Canada 436 
 
0.2683*** 7.15 0.1305*** 18.43 338 -0.0693*** -3.61 0.0167 1.37 
Finland 40 
 
0.3657** 2.95 0.1781*** 4.72 31 -0.0830** -2.28 0.0162 1.27 
France 69 
 
0.1682** 2.10 0.1340*** 4.98 75 -0.0629** -2.09 0.0136 1.01 
Germany 110 
 
0.0689* 1.74 0.0326* 1.91 101 -0.0618** -1.98 0.0143 1.08 
Greece 44 
 
0.0615* 1.68 0.0475*** 4.75 46 -0.0683*** -4.92 0.0074* 1.76 
Italy 55 
 
0.1489*** 5.66 0.0838** 2.72 58 -0.4730*** -7.51 0.0146* 1.94 
Japan 756 
 
0.0912*** 8.86 0.0125*** 17.20 704 -0.0603*** -5.99 0.0013 1.51 
Spain 32 
 
0.4632** 2.29 0.1488*** 5.76 32 -0.0394* -1.87 0.0165 1.35 
UK 304 
 
0.2953* 1.90 0.1177*** 6.94 264 -0.1678** -2.60 0.0101 1.60 
US 1148   0.5545*** 24.80 0.1479*** 24.35 1230 -0.3496** -2.87 0.0135 1.41 
Brazil 44 
 
0.2253*** 2.14 0.0328*** 5.04 37 -0.6423*** -10.25 0.0193 1.47 
Chile 42 
 
0.4742*** 8.45 0.1533*** 7.23 34 -0.0234** -2.01 0.0121 1.31 
Egypt 36 
 
0.1873*** 7.71 0.0282 1.23 18 -0.1932** -2.30 0.0059 0.43 
Hong Kong 284 
 
0.1954*** 10.38 0.0275*** 11.65 234 -0.1547*** -7.13 0.0023 1.39 
India 119 
 
0.1035*** 5.54 0.0579*** 17.01 29 -0.1759** -2.41 0.0040 1.61 
Indonesia 52 
 
0.6930*** 7.31 0.2032*** 7.17 33 -0.2913** -2.35 0.0019 1.10 
Taiwan 474 
 
0.1891*** 5.40 0.0232** 2.96 345 -0.0168** -2.62 0.0024 1.01 
Full sample 4378 
 
0.280*** 6.42 0.107*** 7.84 3872 -0.164*** -4.03 0.014 0.163 
Developed 3327 
 
0.2595*** 5.056 0.1015*** 6.293 3142 -0.1331*** -3.049 0.0125 1.461 
Developing 1051 
 
0.2954*** 3.720 0.0752** 2.733 731 -0.2139** -2.668 0.0068 1.568 
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Table 5: Changes in the return comovement around DJIMWI revisions: The bivariate analysis (Equation (4). E' Islamic is the mean change in slope across the event date. We 
report the mean changes in the slope of the Islamic index ( E' Islamic) and local index ( E' Local). The pre-event and post-event estimation periods are [-12,-1] and [+1,+12] 
months. The t-test is adjusted for cross-correlation and reported next to the change in the slopes and ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
Countries # of firms   Bivariate (added sample)  # of firms Bivariate (deleted sample) 
      E' Islamic t-test E' Local t-test 
 
E' Islamic t-test E' Local t-test 
Australia 333 
 
0.7243*** 5.56 -0.4173** -3.03 263 -0.3198*** -15.27 0.2272*** 8.10 
Canada 436 
 
0.6414*** 18.87 -0.1433*** -5.94 338 -0.3206*** -10.89 0.2064*** 5.58 
Finland 40 
 
0.6221*** 4.77 -0.0054 -0.13 31 -0.6406*** -4.87 0.2038** 2.46 
France 69 
 
0.4931** 2.98 -0.1122* -1.66 75 -0.4299*** -7.25 0.2927** 4.20 
Germany 110 
 
0.0703*** 4.63 -0.2101*** -4.40 101 -0.5666** -2.32 0.1701** 2.61 
Greece 44 
 
0.4068*** 6.44 -0.2380** -2.27 46 -0.4474*** -8.36 0.3794*** 4.54 
Italy 55 
 
0.1779*** 4.21 -0.1109*** -5.66 58 -0.5730*** -6.41 0.1230** 1.99 
Japan 756 
 
0.1834*** 6.35 -0.0785*** -3.27 704 -0.0779*** -4.81 0.8935*** 75.52 
Spain 32 
 
0.4790*** 5.53 -0.0427** -2.03 32 -0.4410*** -5.44 0.2193** 2.58 
UK 304 
 
0.4257*** 7.67 -0.1028* -1.85 264 -0.2513*** -5.14 0.1570*** 4.85 
US 1148 
 
0.8546*** 8.25 -0.5725*** -3.82 1230 -0.5350*** -24.49 0.3649*** 12.81 
Brazil 44 
 
0.2697*** 3.02 -0.1284** -2.26 37 -0.7240*** -7.91 0.5123*** 5.00 
Chile 42 
 
0.4733** 2.75 -0.0019 -0.10 34 -0.3833*** -5.71 0.1400** 1.99 
Egypt 36 
 
0.2976** 2.41 -0.1247** -2.15 18 -0.2362** -2.02 0.1155** 2.09 
Hong Kong 284 
 
0.2254*** 7.38 -0.0119*** -6.27 234 -0.1677*** -4.21 0.3548** 2.47 
India 119 
 
0.2750*** 11.75 -0.0054 -0.23 29 -0.1954*** -4.46 0.0959** 2.18 
Indonesia 52 
 
0.7582*** 5.18 -0.4175*** -3.49 33 -0.3213** -2.42 0.1024** 2.01 
Taiwan 474 
 
0.1947*** 4.00 -0.1413** -2.01 345 -0.1748*** -11.05 0.1570*** 4.87 
Full sample 4378 
 
0.421*** 7.83 -0.159*** -4.21 3872 -0.378*** -8.89 0.262*** 5.700 
Developed 3327 
 
0.4617*** 6.261 -0.1849*** -3.596 3142 -0.4185*** -8.393 0.2943*** 4.546 
Developing 1051 
 
0.3563*** 4.753 -0.1187*** -2.152 731 -0.3147*** -4.217 0.2111*** 3.491 
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Table 6: Effect of changes in firm fundamentals on change in the return comovement structure following DJIMWI revisions. 
The number of firms is the same as in the previous tables. Panel A shows the results from the sample of additions, while 
Panel B shows the results from the sample of deletions.  MV is the logarithm of market capitalisation at the fiscal year-end. 
BMT is the book value of equity scaled by the market value at the fiscal year-end. ROE is earnings divided by equity book 
value. IVS is capital expenditure scaled by total assets, LEV is the sum of short-term and long-term debts scaled by the total 
book value of assets and ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Country Constant ΔMV ΔBTM ΔROE ΔIVS ΔLEV 
Panel A Coeff t-test Coeff t-test Coeff t-test Coeff t-test Coeff t-test Coeff t-test 
Australia 0.5201*** 7.262 0.0000 -0.013 0.0003 1.219 -0.0001 -0.430 -0.0005 -0.522 -0.0006 -1.174 
Canada 0.4780** 2.786 -0.0009 -0.248 -0.0002 -0.223 -0.0002 -0.211 0.0047 1.279 -0.0028* -1.683 
Finland 0.5001** 2.485 -0.0022 -0.842 0.0016* 1.747 0.0008 1.056 0.0026 0.990 -0.0003 -0.447 
France 0.5028** 2.642 -0.0040 -0.991 0.0010 0.840 0.0012 1.037 -0.0055 -1.381 -0.0005 -0.423 
Germany 0.4983** 2.269 0.0040 1.393 0.0005 0.579 -0.0005 -0.657 -0.0004 -0.145 -0.0001 -0.115 
Greece 0.5002** 2.047 -0.0003 -0.086 -0.0018* -1.786 0.0009 1.006 0.0015 0.459 -0.0024 -1.757 
Italy 0.4999*** 6.443 0.0002 0.159 0.0000 0.017 0.0000 -0.115 -0.0010 -0.941 -0.0003 -1.073 
Japan 0.5002*** 4.363 0.0018 1.189 0.0004 0.975 0.0007 1.617 -0.0018 -1.223 -0.0004 -0.925 
Spain 0.4965** 2.332 0.0053* 1.691 0.0012 1.527 -0.0007 -0.899 0.0012 0.434 0.0001 0.173 
UK 0.4999** 2.805 0.0033 1.414 0.0005 0.803 0.0003 0.378 -0.0020 -0.857 0.0000 0.014 
US 0.5006** 2.186 -0.0006 -1.009 0.0001 0.579 0.0001 0.806 -0.0006 -0.951 -0.0001 -0.505 
Brazil 0.5187** 2.641 0.0007 0.177 0.0008 0.691 -0.0013 -1.145 0.0001 0.033 0.0006 0.496 
Chile 0.4658** 2.270 0.0037 1.296 -0.0016* -1.759 -0.0009 -1.133 0.0036 1.254 -0.0006 -0.761 
Egypt 0.4890*** 7.642 0.0010 1.173 0.0002 0.854 0.0001 0.363 0.0002 0.283 -0.0002 -0.817 
Hong Kong 0.5001** 2.895 -0.0016 -0.729 -0.0006 -0.965 0.0004 0.556 0.0007 0.332 -0.0002 -0.287 
India 0.4989*** 3.900 0.0016 0.976 0.0004 0.810 -0.0001 -0.134 -0.0001 -0.089 -0.0005 -1.057 
Indonesia 0.5011** 2.464 0.0006 0.241 0.0004 0.553 0.0008 1.099 -0.0021 -0.797 -0.0007 -0.955 
Taiwan 0.5041** 2.698 -0.0060 -1.533 -0.0002 -0.153 0.0003 0.225 0.0009 0.242 0.0004 0.376 
Full sample 0.281*** 5.38 0.0190 0.850 0.0090 1.360 0.0110* 1.74 0.0060 0.180 0.0040 0.610 
Developed 0.4897*** 3.692 0.0006 0.720 0.0003 1.224 0.0002 1.239 -0.0002 -0.203 -0.0007 -1.277 
Developing 0.4968*** 8.783 0.0001 0.004 -0.0001 -0.281 -0.0001 -0.355 0.0005 0.737 -0.0002 -0.909 
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Table 6 continues 
Country Constant Size_Change BTM_Change ROE_Change Investment_Change Leverage_Change 
Panel B Coeff t-test Coeff t-test Coeff t-test Coeff t-test Coeff t-test Coeff t-test 
Australia -0.5005*** -7.260 -0.0003 -0.386 -0.0003 -1.143 -0.0002 -0.902 0.0012 1.280 -0.0005* -1.694 
Canada -0.4974** -2.772 -0.0017 -0.460 -0.0009 -0.881 -0.0011 -1.026 -0.0046 -1.267 -0.0015 -1.384 
Finland -0.4989** -2.494 -0.0006 -0.235 0.0009 1.198 0.0014* 1.829 -0.0007 -0.271 0.0003 0.409 
France -0.4959** -2.624 -0.0051 -1.280 0.0017 1.459 -0.0003 -0.231 -0.0024 -0.594 -0.0014 -1.216 
Germany -0.5015** -2.284 0.0020 0.684 0.0004 0.470 -0.0013 -1.559 0.0006 0.194 0.0002 0.258 
Greece -0.4996** -2.042 -0.0015 -0.462 0.0014 1.522 0.0003 0.360 0.0024 0.735 -0.0009 -0.967 
Italy -0.4998*** -6.422 0.0000 -0.024 0.0002 0.767 -0.0007* -1.723 0.0001 0.098 -0.0002 -0.787 
Japan -0.5016*** -4.367 0.0011 0.744 0.0000 -0.001 -0.0006 -1.427 0.0012 0.768 -0.0002 -0.494 
Spain -0.5018** -2.363 -0.0002 -0.056 0.0015* 1.898 0.0006 0.716 0.0008 0.281 0.0016* 1.704 
UK -0.5015** -2.815 0.0018 0.754 0.0001 0.100 0.0001 0.213 0.0023 0.982 0.0006 0.924 
US -0.5011** -2.185 0.0011* 1.790 0.0000 0.179 -0.0002 -1.091 0.0014* 1.7403 -0.0002 -1.050 
Brazil -0.4992** -2.638 -0.0008 -0.203 -0.0023* -1.713 0.0003 0.286 -0.0008 -0.196 0.0015 1.289 
Chile -0.5022** -2.289 0.0007 0.240 -0.0007 -0.877 0.0005 0.549 0.0016 0.570 -0.0001 -0.125 
Egypt -0.5000*** -7.648 0.0012 1.350 -0.0003 -1.080 0.0003 1.087 -0.0008 -0.899 0.0003 1.156 
Hong Kong -0.4994** -2.887 -0.0024 -1.075 -0.0009 -1.398 0.0000 0.021 0.0019 0.833 0.0001 0.128 
India -0.5030*** -3.918 0.0033* 1.795 0.0005 0.934 0.0005 0.965 0.0017 1.012 0.0001 0.259 
Indonesia -0.5000** -2.459 0.0009 0.354 0.0004 0.477 -0.0002 -0.287 -0.0011 -0.412 0.0004 0.504 
Taiwan -0.5014** -2.686 -0.0018 -0.458 -0.0010 -0.898 0.0007 0.585 0.0022 0.574 0.0022* 1.693 
Full sample -0.1900*** -4.061 0.018 0.840 0.001 0.030 -0.004 -0.570 0.037 1.630 -0.006 -0.920 
Developed -0.5000*** -8.269 -0.0003 -0.511 0.0005* 1.835 -0.0002 -0.780 0.0002 0.331 -0.0002 -0.742 
Developing -0.5007*** -9.236 0.0002 0.212 -0.0006* -1.706 0.0003* 1.853 0.0007 1.196 0.0006* 1.919 
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Appendix: This table presents the regression results of the three factor models by country (Eq.(1) in Section 3). Panel A shows the results 
of the added sample, while Panel B shows the results of the deleted sample. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. Equation (1) is estimated over a minimum 50-day window ending 16 days before the announcement date for each 
portfolio company in a country j. Ri,j,t  is the continuously compounded return adjusted for dividend for stock i, country j at time t; Rm,j,t is 
the logarithmic return of the local market index in country j at time t; βb  is the market beta. SMBs,j,t is the difference between the excess 
return on a portfolio of small stocks and the excess return on a portfolio of big stocks in country j at time t; βs is the SMB factor load. 
HMLh,j,t is the difference between the excess return on a portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and the excess return on a portfolio of 
low-book-to-market stocks in country j at time t, βh is the HML factor, while εi,j,t is the error term. 
Country Constant tjmR ,,  tjsSMB ,,  tjhHML ,,  
Panel A: Added sample iD  t-test bE  t-test sE  t-test hE  T-test 
         
Australia 0.0013*** 4.447 0. 6700*** 7.416 0.0115*** 6.336 0.0021*** 3.025 
Canada 0.0021* 1.732 0. 3100*** 8.816 0.0085*** 3.011 0.0016 0.600 
Finland 0.0014** 3.142 0. 6700*** 4.489 0.0056*** 5.500 -0.0074*** -6.626 
France 0.0009* 1.983 0. 6200*** 4.416 0.0078*** 7.292 -0.0021** -2.053 
Germany 0.0003 0.603 0. 8800*** 6.334 0.0043*** 3.730 0.0005 0.489 
Greece 0.0007 1.245 0. 8700*** 3.577 0.0083*** 6.687 0.0023** 1.967 
Italy 0.0002 0.831 0. 600*** 8.598 0.0045*** 7.235 0.0006 0.895 
Japan 0.0009** 3.594 0. 5300*** 9.711 0.0109*** 8.421 0.0002 0.359 
Spain 0.0004 0.906 0. 7300*** 5.988 0.0043*** 4.444 0.0024** 2.690 
U.K. 0.0055 0.121 0. 9200*** 9.134 0.0013 1.183 0.0046*** 4.681 
U.S. 0.0005*** 3.347 0. 9400*** 5.849 0.0023*** 5.539 -0.0020*** -3.807 
Brazil 0.0006 1.179 0. 7100*** 7.140 0.0048*** 3.806 0.0010 0.878 
Chile 0.0013** 3.371 0. 3700*** 8.845 0.0008 0.734 0.0005 0.571 
Egypt 0.0014* 1.739 0. 3200*** 4.583 0.0055** 2.853 0.0062** 3.135 
Hong Kong 0.0016** 2.678 0. 7000*** 7.759 0.0097*** 6.754 -0.0025* -1.773 
India 0.0010 1.259 0. 5600** 8.089 0.0031* 1.642 0.0038** 1.985 
Indonesia 0.0054** 3.501 0. 6500** 3.225 0.0064 1.513 0.0069 1.328 
Taiwan 0.0006** 2.423 0. 4200*** 5.224 0.0068*** 7.071 0.0006 0.939 
Panel B: Deleted sample 
        
Australia 0.0007** 2.446 0. 3700*** 5.779 0.0063*** 8.985 0.0011* 1.664 
Canada 0.0011 0.935 0. 6100*** 4.760 0.0046* 1.626 0.0009 0.324 
Finland 0.0005* 1.665 0. 3500*** 7.679 0.0030** 2.915 -0.0039*** -3.511 
France 0.0006 1.209 0. 3800*** 7.574 0.0048*** 4.448 -0.0013 -1.252 
Germany 0.0002 0.374 0. 5500*** 4.127 0.0027** 2.312 0.0003 0.303 
Greece 0.0005 0.784 0. 5600*** 8.554 0.0052*** 4.212 0.0015 1.239 
Italy 0.0001 0.474 0. 3400*** 5.601 0.0026*** 4.124 0.0003 0.510 
Japan 0.0005** 2.049 0. 3000*** 6.235 0.0062*** 5.500 0.0001 0.205 
Spain 0.0002 0.489 0. 3900*** 8.633 0.0023** 2.399 0.0013 1.452 
U.K. 0.0029 0.064 0. 4900*** 5.141 0.0007 0.627 0.0025** 2.481 
U.S. 0.0003** 2.108 0. 5900*** 7.925 0.0015** 3.489 -0.0012** -2.398 
Brazil 0.0002 0.624 0. 5700*** 9.084 0.0025** 2.017 0.0005 0.465 
Chile 0.0008** 1.955 0. 2100*** 5.130 0.0004 0.426 0.0002 0.331 
Egypt 0.0007 0.939 0. 1800** 2.474 0.0030 1.541 0.0033* 1.693 
Hong Kong 0.0009 1.500 0. 3900*** 6.025 0.0054*** 3.782 -0.0014 -0.993 
India 0.0006 0.768 0. 3400*** 4.934 0.0019 1.001 0.0023 1.211 
Indonesia 0.0028* 1.820 0. 3100* 1.677 0.0033 0.787 0.0036 0.690 
Taiwan 0.0004 1.381 0. 2400*** 8.678 0.0039*** 6.310 0.0003 0.535 
 
